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BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 327(a)
- NEW INTERPRETATION FORCES
ATTORNEYS TO WAIVE FEES OR
WAVE GOOD-BYE TO CLIENTS
"Until very recently bankruptcy, like sex, was looked upon as a necessary
part of life, but not anything that respectable citizenry would publicly
acknowledge."'
Recent years have seen an increase in the number of bankruptcy petitions
filed.' More attorneys are finding themselves in the bankruptcy courts, even
though they are not "bankruptcy experts." Often, clients will seek the attor-
neys with whom they are most familiar to represent them in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. A debtor may choose an attorney to represent him in bankruptcy
proceedings because the attorney has previously represented the debtor, be-
cause the attorney is a shareholder or officer in the debtor corporation, or be-
cause the attorney has in some other way been affiliated with the debtor in the
past. But a trap awaits the unwary attorney. Under Section 327(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code3 (hereinafter referred to as the Code), the same factors of
familiarity that caused the debtor to seek the services of a particular attorney
could create a conflict of interest sufficient to prevent'recovery of attorneys
fees for services rendered in connection with the bankruptcy case.
This Comment will examine Section 327 of the Code, the bankruptcy pro-
vision regarding conflict of interest and will investigate the developing case law
in this area.
Section 327(a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the trustee, with the court's ap-
proval, may employ one or more attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auction-
eers, or other professional persons, that do not hold or represent an interest
adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons, to represent or assist
the trustee in carrying out the trustee's duties under this title.
4
Section 327 is made applicable to debtors in possession by Section 1107
of the Code,5 which provides that a debtor in possession stands in the shoes of
1. Lavien, Fees as Seen From the Bench, 89 Comm. L.J. 136 (1984).
2. In 1975, a total of 254,484 bankruptcy petitions were filed in the United
States. In 1985, 364,536 petitions were filed. The number of "business-related" peti-
tions more than doubled from 1975 when about 30,000 such petitions were filed, to
1985 when nearly 67,000 petitions of this type were filed. STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF
THE UNITED STATES, table 867 (107th ed. 1987).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 327 (1979).
4. Id. (emphasis added).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1979). This section, entitled "Rights, powers, and duties of
1
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a trustee in every way.6 Consequently, an attorney for a debtor in possession
must meet the requirements set forth in Section 327(a) of the Code.7
The penalty for violating Section 327 is harsh. Section 328(c)" authorizes
a court to deny compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses
where a professional represents an adverse interest.9
The principal that an attorney should not represent adverse interests is
hardly novel. By the seventeenth century, common law had established that an
attorney must not represent opposing interests. 10 The usual consequence of dis-
regarding this principle is the denial of attorneys fees."
The statutory requirement of employing only disinterested persons under
Section 327 is rooted in the policy that professionals engaged to work on a
bankruptcy case should be free of the slightest personal interest which might
influence their decisions regarding the debtor's estate.12 An attorney should
not place himself in a position where he may be forced to choose between his
own interest and the interest of his client. 3 When an attorney is owed pre-
petition fees by the debtor in possession, the attorney acquires the dual status
of attorney and unsecured creditor. The best interests of the debtor in posses-
sion may or may not be identical to those of the unsecured creditors. The
debtor in possession," provides as follows:
(a)Subject to any limitations on a trustee serving in a case under this chapter,
and to such limitations or conditions as the court prescribes, a debtor in pos-
session shall have all the rights, other than the right to compensation under
Section 330 of this title, and powers, and shall perform all the functions and
duties, except the duties specified in Sections 1106(a)(2)(3), and (4) of this
title, of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.
(b)Notwithstanding Section 327(a) of this title, a person is not disqualified
for employment under Section 327 of this title by a debtor in possession solely
because of such person's employment by or representation of the debtor
before the commencement of the case.
6. There are certain exceptions which are not relevant here. For example, a
debtor in possession, unlike the trustee, does not have a right to compensation for man-
aging the bankruptcy estate, nor does the debtor in possession have the investigative
duties of the trustee. 11 'U.S.C. § 1106(a)(2)-(4) (1979).
7. In re Seatrain Lines Inc., 13 Bankr. 980, 981 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) (1979) provides as follows:
Except as provided in Section 327(c), 327(e), or 1107(b) of this title, the
court may deny allowance of compensation for services and reimbursement of
expenses of a professional person employed under Section 327 or 1103 of this
title. Such professional person is not a disinterested person, or represents or
holds an interest adverse to the interest of the estate with respect to the mat-
ter on which such professional person is employed.
9. The requirements of § 327 and the penalties imposed by § 328 apply to all
professionals hired by the trustee or the debtor in possession; however, this Comment
will focus upon the employment of an attorney by the debtor in possession.
10. Shire v. King, Yelverton 32, 80 Eng. Rep. 24 (K.B. 1603); Anonymous, 7
Modern 47, 87 Eng. Rep. 1085 (Q.B. 1702).
11. Silbiger v. Prudence Bond Corp., 180 F.2d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1980).
12. 1 COLLIER, COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 1 101.13 (1981).
13. In re Roberts, 46 Bankr. 815 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985).
[Vol. 53
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Code's requirement that attorneys be disinterested and free from any potential
conflicts of interest is easy to understand. The difficulty lies in recognizing and
defining conflicts of interest in the bankruptcy context.
Under Section 327(a), a two-prong test must be met before an attorney or
any other professional may be employed to assist with the bankruptcy estate.14
First, the attorney must hold no interest adverse to the estate.15 Second, the
attorney for the trustee must be a "disinterested person."'" Section 101(13) of
the Code defines a "disinterested person" as a person who:
(A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider;
(B) is not and was not an investment banker for any outstanding security of
the debtor;
(C) has not been, within three years before the date of filing of the petition,
an investment banker for a security of the debtor, or an attorney for such an
investment banker in connection with the offer, sale, or issuance of a security
of the debtor;
(D) is not and was not, within two years before the date of the filing of the
petition a director, officer or employee of the debtor or an investment banker
specified in subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph; and
(E) does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate
or of any class of creditors. 17
The definition of "disinterested person" was adopted with some modifica-
tion from Section 158 of Chapter 10 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.8 Cases
decided under Section 158 held that the tests of disinterestedness were to be
rigidly applied and could not be waived because of the integrity or ability of
the particular person involved.' This notion still holds true today.20
A "materially adverse interest" as prohibited by Section 101(13)(E)2' is
not defined within the Code. This lack of definition promotes confusion in that
327(a) requires the professional must be disinterested as well as not hold an
interest adverse to the estate, while the Code's definition of "disinterested per-
son" expressly includes one that holds an interest materially adverse to the
estate.
Determining precisely what type of relationship between an attorney and
a debtor in possession will constitute a conflict of interest under Section 327 is
further complicated. There is authority which suggests that the enunciated ele-
ments of Section 101(13) do not comprise an exclusive list of the criteria for
14. In re Leisure Dynamics, 33 Bankr. 121, 122 (D. Minn. 1983).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (1979).
18. 1 COLLIER, supra note 12.
19. See, e.g., Meredith v. Thralls, 144 F.2d 473, 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 758 (1944); In re Realty Assoc. Sec. Corp., 56 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D.N.Y. 1944).
20. See, e.g., In re Daig Corp., 799 F.2d 1251 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Gray, 64
Bankr. 505 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, 20 Bankr. 328
(E.D. Pa. 1982).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(E) (1979).
3
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the disqualification of a disinterested professional.2" If a court finds that the
attorney or professional to be employed has had associations with the debtor
which might make him or her interested, the court may reject that person even
though those associations do not come strictly within the purview of Section
101(13).23 Section 101(13), subsection (E) of the definition of disinterested
persons may be viewed as a catchall provision. By failing to define adverse
interest, the subsection allows courts to use subsection (E) as a safety-valve to
find a would-be debtor's attorney lacking in disinterestedness for reasons other
than those enumerated in the non-exclusive statutory guidelines.24
Since the Code itself provides no insight into the possibility that an attor-
ney may be jeopardizing dismissal of all fees incurred in the bankruptcy case
because he or she is not disinterested, attorneys would benefit by keeping
abreast of recent case law on the subject. A survey of the case law on this
issue follows. 25
A recent Eighth Circuit decision, In re Pierce,2 8 is a paradigm case which
illustrates the need for attorneys to remain aware of recent court interpreta-
tions of Section 327. In Pierce, the court held that an attorney who is owed
pre-petition fees is not "disinterested. 1 7 In the case, the debtors employed the
attorney to recover on a crop insurance policy. Shortly thereafter, the attorney
began to prepare the debtors' bankruptcy petitions. To secure payment for his
work on the bankruptcy case, the attorney obtained an $8,000 mortgage on
real estate owned by the debtors. The Eighth Circuit held that as to the bank-
ruptcy-related fees, the attorney would be denied fees because he was a pre-
petition creditor of the debtor, and thus did not meet the definition of a "disin-
terested person" under Section 327(a).2 8
The court implied that disclosure of the mortgage would not have
22. In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, 20 Bankr. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
23. In re Roberts, 46 Bankr. 815, 828, 840-42 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) cites the
following cases which do not expressly fall within the provisions of § 101(13) where a
conflict of interest was found to exist: In re WPMK, Inc., 42 Bankr. 157 (Bankr. D.
Haw. 1984) (debtor's attorney received undisclosed fee payments from the debtor's
principal and investors who were creditors and who were promised reimbursement for
their contributions upon the court's approval of the attorney's fee application); In re
Cropper Co., 35 Bankr. 625 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983) (associate of the law firm that
represented the debtor owns 38 % of the stock of a company that had arranged, post-
petition, to buy goods from the debtor on credit, in exchange for the debtor buying the
goods from a supplier for cash); In re Smith, 5 Bankr. 92 (Bankr. D.C. 1980) (attorney
for debtor also represented the debt consolidation agency that referred the debtor to
the attorney).
24. Philadelphia Athletic Club, 20 Bankr. at 334.
25. This sampling of case law is not intended to serve as a complete guide to the
complexities involved in interpreting § 327 of the Code, but rather is intended to in-
crease awareness so that the practicing attorney will be better equipped to recognize
potential conflicts.
26. 809 F.2d 1356 (8th Cir. 1987).
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changed the result in this case." The court noted that the attorney's fees could
have been denied on three separate grounds in this case 30 One cause for deny-
ing compensation would be the attorney's violation of the disclosure require-
ments embodied in Section 328(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 2014(a). Second, the
court could have denied fees by concluding that the attorney's pre-petition
mortgage on the debtor's real estate constitutes an "adverse interest" under
Section 327(a).31 The third ground for denial of fees, failure to meet the "dis-
interested person" requirement, was the basis for the Eighth Circuit's final
holding. 2
The consequences of the Pierce case could be staggering. Imagine a small
law firm that has spent hundreds of hours working on a reorganization plan
for its largest client only to find that its efforts will not be rewarded because of
either some adverse interest, no matter how obscure, or because the debtor
owes the firm for pre-petition services rendered. Pierce is an extension of the
Eighth Circuit's ruling In re Daig Corp.33 In Daig, a management consulting
firm was determined not to have met the "disinterested person" requirement
by virtue of the firm's receipt of an unapproved stock purchase warran3 4 from
the debtor. Shortly after the debtor, Daig, entered bankruptcy it hired the
consulting firm, Merrimac, as a management consultant. In addition to com-
pensation of $1,500/week, Merrimac received a five year warrant to purchase
15 % of Daig's common stock at one cent per share. The Bankruptcy Court of
the District of Minnesota authorized Daig's employment of Merrimac, but re-
served all questions in regard to the terms of retention and compensation. The
court later limited Merrimac's compensation because the debtor, Daig, had
given Merrimac a warrant. The court explained that warrant holders are in-
cluded in the Code definition of equity security holders.3 5 To be disinterested,
a person or entity cannot hold an equity security.' Therefore, a warrant
holder is not a disinterested person and the court may apply Section 328(c) to
deny allowance of compensation for a professional who is not a disinterested
person at any time during the employment by the debtor.
The Eighth Circuit's strict interpretation of the "disinterested" standard
would appear to overrule the case of In re Heatron.7 That case had been
29. Id. at 1363.
30. Id.
31. This is in accord with the holding of In re Martin, 62 Bankr. 943 (D. Me.
1986). In Martin, the law firm representing the debtor received a mortgage on the
debtor's property in lieu of a retainer. The court found that a potential conflict existed
so that the law firm was not "disinterested." Id. at 948.
32. 809 F.2d at 1363.
33. 799 F.2d 1251 (8th Cir. 1986).
34. A warrant is defined as an option to purchase shares of stock at a fixed price.
Id. at 1253 (citing 4 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 8967, at 70 (1985)).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 101(15)(c) (1979).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 101(13)(a) (1979).
37. 5 Bankr. 703 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
1988]
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heavily cited in support of the argument that, merely because a law firm is a
creditor of the debtor, the attorney is not necessarily barred from representing
the debtor and collecting fees. In Heatron, the attorney representing the
debtor in possession had represented the debtor prior to the filing and as a
result of the pre-petition services was one of the ten largest creditors of the
estate. The court found that the attorney's status as a major creditor would
not cause the attorney's disqualification when it was the debtor in possession,
cloaked in the powers of the trustee, who proposed to hire the attorney.38
The court reached its conclusion by attempting to reconcile Sections
327(a) and 1107(b) of the Code in a manner that would allow the attorney-
creditor to continue representing the debtor. Section 1107(b) states that "not-
withstanding § 327(a) of this title, a person is not disqualified for employment
under § 327 of this title by a debtor in possession solely because of such per-
son's employment by or representation of the debtor before the commencement
of the case."'39 The court, without analysis or explanation, determined that
Section 1107(b) creates a distinction between the hiring of an attorney as rep-
resentative of the trustee generally versus the hiring of an attorney to assist
the debtor in possession.40 The court reasoned that an attorney's status as a
creditor of the estate is less significant when his service to the estate is merely
a continuation of services provided to the debtor prior to the filing.4 ' The court
cited no authority nor were there any policy reasons for this distinction.
In an attempt to rationalize its holding, the court in Heatron applied a
balancing test in its decision to allow the attorney-creditor to represent the
debtor. The court considered that the attorney who represented the debtor
prior to the filing of the petition was most familiar with the debtor's problems,
and that retention of the debtor's pre-bankruptcy attorney is most efficient,
economical, and generally in the best interests of the estate.42 Against these
factors, the court weighed whether the attorney's status as a creditor actually
put the attorney in a position adverse to the estate.43 Using a rather simplistic
analysis, it determined that an unsecured creditor is not adverse to the estate
because the unsecured creditors stand to profit from a successful reorganiza-
tion plan.4 4 According to the Heatron court, the best interest of the debtor and
38. Id. at 705.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(b) (1979). See supra note 5.
40. 5 Bankr. at 705. The court states that "[tihe language of Section 327(b),
when taken with the proviso in Section 1107(b), creates a distinction between the hir-
ing of an attorney as representative of the trustee generally and the hiring of an attor-
ney to assist in the operation of the business." Id. This distinction was not clarified.
Moreover, the court failed to reconcile this conclusion with their prior acknowledge-
ment that "[s]ection 1107, Title 11, U.S.C., gives the debtor in possession the same
rights and powers as a trustee, with certain exceptions not relevant here." Id. at 704.
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the unsecured creditor will always be identical.4 5 However, the converse is
often the case. For example, an attorney-creditor may favor a sale that is ad-
vantageous from the point of view of the creditors and the debtor may be
trying to save his business and opt for a marginal plan of reorganization so
that the business may continue.4
While the Heatron approach may seem more equitable than the denial of
all attorneys fees when no actual conflict exists, the decision ignores the clear,
unambiguous language of the Code and the contrary case law in this area.
Section 327(a) plainly states that a "disinterested" person may not be em-
ployed, and "disinterested person" is expressly defined in § 101(13)(A) as in-
cluding creditors.47
Other courts have rejected the Heatron argument that Section 1107(b) is
a safe harbor for attorney-creditors.48 The better reasoned opinions hold that
Section 1107(b) will not prevent the disqualification of attorneys (whether the
attorney is representing the trustee or the debtor in possession) when the attor-
ney is not a disinterested person without an adverse interest.49 Just because an
attorney has represented the debtor in prior matters not relating to the bank-
ruptcy, the attorney is not immune from the requirements of Section 327(a). 50
The court in In re Anver" explained that in accordance with Section
1107(b), an attorney is not to be disqualified solely on the basis of her employ-
ment by or her representation of the debtor. The court further affirmed that
counsel was certainly not being disqualified solely because of prior representa-
tion of the debtor.52 The attorney in the Anver case attempted unsuccessfully
to present the same argument as the court followed in Heatron.53 That is, the
attorney proposed that Section 1107(b) applies to totally eliminate the disin-
terested person requirement in cases where a debtor in possession rather than
a trustee employs an attorney." Anver rejected this "tortured interpretation"
and applied ordinary rules of statutory construction to determine the true
meaning of Section 1107(b), as it relates to the requirements of Section
327(a).55 "The statute should be interpreted as written, unless the language is
45. Id. The court stated that an unsecured creditor stands to lose a great deal in
liquidation; thus, the unsecured creditor is aligned with the debtor in supporting a reor-
ganization plan.
46. In re Anver Corp., 44 Bankr. 615 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
47. 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a), 101(13)(A) (1979).
48. See, e.g., In re Roberts, 75 Bankr. 402, 408 (D. Utah 1987); In re Anver
Corp., 44 Bankr. 615 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984); In re B.E.T. Genetics, Inc., 35 Bankr.
269 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1983).
49. In re Anver Corp., 44 Bankr. 615, 618 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
50. Id.
51. 44 Bankr. 615 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
52. Id. at 616.
53. 5 Bankr. at 705.
54. 44 Bankr. at 616.
55. Id. at 616-17 ("Counsel's conclusion that the section applies to totally ex-
clude the 'disinterested person' requirement in cases where a debtor in possession,
1988]
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ambiguous or would produce an absurd result.' '56 The language of both Sec-
tions 327(a) and 1107(b) is plain and unambiguous. The intent of the two
sections is equally clear. The disinterested person requirement of Section 327
promotes the general policy that a professional should be free of the slightest
personal interest which might color their judgement or influence their deci-
sion-making ability.5
7
Section 1107(b) states that prior representation of a debtor, standing
alone, is insufficient reason to ban the employment of an attorney.58 Section
1107(b) was left unamended by the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments. Both case
law59 and congressional intent" indicate that Section 1107(b) was not in-
tended to operate as a blanket exception to the requirements of Section
327(a). Congress deliberately chose to place both the disinterested standard as
well as the adverse interest standard on the debtor in possession when it en-
acted the new Code.6"
The weight of authority agrees that Section 1107(b) does not excuse at-
torneys from compliance with the requirement that the attorney be a disinter-
ested person. 2 The issue to be resolved in each case is not whether a particu-
lar attorney or law firm is disqualified solely because of previous employment
by the debtor. Rather, the issue is whether the attorney should be disqualified
because he or she is not a disinterested person as that term is defined in the
Code or because the attorney holds an interest adverse to the estate.63
The Heatron" case, holding that an attorney may be both creditor and
counsel of the debtor, seems to be an aberration, though it is often authorita-
tively cited. Assuming that In re Pierce5 places the Eighth Circuit into the
rather than a trustee, employs an attorney, requires a tortured interpretation which the
court cannot accept.").
56. Id. at 617.
57. 1 COLLIER, supra note 12.
58. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 48.
60. The legislative history of § 1107(b) may be found in S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 116, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5902.
The history of this provision indicates that the debtor-in-possession has the identical
duties of a trustee (except investigative duties). Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 649-
50 (1963), was cited as an example of a pre-Code Chapter X case where a debtor's
counsel who traded in the debtor's stock was disqualified.
61. In re Leisure Dynamics, 32 Bankr. 753, 755 (D. Minn. 1983). An additional
indication exists that the disinterested provision was intended by Congress to apply to
attorneys employed by debtors in possession. Under former Bankruptcy Rule 215 of the
old Bankruptcy Act only the adverse interest standard was applied for disqualification
of an attorney of the debtor in possession. By eliminating this provision of Rule 215
when it enacted the new code, Congress deliberately chose to place both the "disinter-
ested person" and the "adverse interest" constraints on the debtor in possession.
62. See, e.g., In re Patterson, 53 Bankr. 366, 372 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985) (quot-
ing I W. NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 13.26, at 41 (1981)).
63. In re B.E.T. Genetics, 35 Bankr. 269, 272 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1983).
64. In re Heatron, Inc., 5 Bankr. 703, 705 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
65. 809 F.2d 1356, 1362 (8th Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 53
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mainstream by recognizing that an attorney cannot play the dual roles of at-
torney and creditor, what are the implications for the practicing bar?
The significance of the Pierce case is that if a debtor, on the date the
petition for bankruptcy is filed, owes an attorney or law firm a pre-petition
debt for legal services not rendered in contemplation of or in connection with
the bankruptcy case, the attorney and/or the law firm is a creditor of the
debtor to the extent of those fees. Consequently, because Section 327 requires
the attorney to be disinterested, attorneys owed fees must choose between
waiving the pre-petition fee claim or referring the Chapter 11 case to another
attorney.
The first step in preventing this dilemma caused by Pierce, is to be cogni-
zant of those situations in which a potential conflict might arise by remaining
aware of the developing decisional law in this area.66
The next step is to determine what, if anything, an attorney may do to
prevent having spent countless hours on a bankruptcy case only to find that a
conflict has made the work pro bono. There is authority which suggests that so
long as an attorney discloses all prior involvement with the debtor pursuant to
Rule 2014,7 most conflict problems may be resolved.68
Some courts take the approach that nondisclosure of information pertain-
ing to the attorney-clients relationship and fee arrangement should be consid-
ered as only one factor in determining whether to deny compensation. Only
when failure to disclose a prior relationship is combined with other attorney
misconduct does the attorney "get what he deserves" and not get paid. Other
66. Conflicts of interest in the bankruptcy context are certainly not limited to
those cases where an attorney is a creditor of the debtor, although that factual situation
is the focus of this Comment. For an in-depth scholarly opinion of other types of con-
flicts in bankruptcy cases, see In re Roberts, 46 Bankr. 815 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985),
rev'd in part, 75 Bankr. 402 (D. Utah 1987).
67. BANKR. R. P. 2014 provides that such disclosure is mandatory. The problem
is recognizing what type of dealings or former contact with the debtor should be dis-
closed, and to what extent disclosure should be made under this rule.
68. Full disclosure prevents conflict problems by allowing a fully informed court
to decide whether to allow a firm in a potential conflict situation to represent the
debtor. If the court makes a well-founded decision to disqualify the firm, post-petition
fees cannot be incurred or subsequently denied. In re Rogers-Pyatt Shellac Co., 51
F.2d 988, 992 (2d Cir. 1931); In re Gray, 64 Bankr. 505, 508 (Bankr. E.D. Mich
1986).
69. In re Michigan Gen. Corp., 78 Bankr. 479, 483 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987)
(court stated that failure to disclose was an important aspect of the case but declined to
answer whether the holding would have been different if disclosure had been made); In
re Roberts, 75 Bankr. 402, 410-13 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987) ("where the equities out-
weigh the need for attorney discipline for failure to disclose potential conflicts, the law
does not require the denial of fees and costs"); In re B.E.T. Genetics, 35 Bankr. 269,
273-74 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1983) (court states that several factors are present to support
a finding that the law firm there was disinterested - one of the enumerated factors was
the firm's failure to disclose information). It is worth noting that some courts tend to
relax the rule denying all compensation in Chapter 11 cases. In re GHR Energy Corp.,
60 Bankr. 52, 68 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985).
1988]
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courts follow the extreme position that nondisclosure of any relevant informa-
tion regarding an attorney's application for employment is, without more,
grounds for the denial of fees.1 0 Theoretically, attorneys could be denied fees
even where no actual or potential conflict exists - merely an omission of any
prior contact with the debtor could suffice as a violation of the disclosure re-
quirement under this harsh construction of the rule.
The Code and Bankruptcy Rules, as well as in compliance with the provi-
sions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, establish that attorneys who
seek employment under Section 327 of the Code and who are aware they may
be involved in actual or potential conflicts of interest, must disclose those facts
to the court.7' Attorneys are bound by duty to completely disclose all facts
bearing upon their eligibility for appointment in a bankruptcy case. An inno-
cent omission is no excuse. 72 Likewise, ignorance of relevant factors is
unjustifiable.73
The duty of an attorney seeking employment in a bankruptcy case arises
from the fiduciary obligation owed by counsel for the debtor to the bankruptcy
court. 74 Because attorneys who seek compensation for services or reimburse-
ment of expenses do so as officers of the court, they are held to fiduciary stan-
dards. 75 The Bankruptcy Court itself is under no obligation to search the file
to determine whether a prospective attorney is involved in actual or potential
conflicts of interest." This is the responsibility of the attorney.
One purpose of the disclosure requirements is to assure that the appointed
attorney will not be adjudged as disqualified and/or ineligible to collect a fee
because he is not disinterested.77 However, a liberal reading of the Code pro-
vides no guarantees that an attorney will receive his fees, even if his employ-
ment is initially approved by the court. Section 328(c) of the Code allows the
court to deny allowance of compensation, "if, at any time . . . such profes-
sional person is not a disinterested person, or represents or holds an interest
70. In re Pierce, 809 F.2d 1356 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Futuronics Corp., 655
F.2d 463, 469 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Haldeman Pipe & Supply Co., 417 F.2d 1302,
1304 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Thompson, 54 Bankr. 311, 316 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985);
In re Guy Apple Masonry Contractor, Inc., 45 Bankr. 160, 163 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1984); In re Devers, 33 Bankr. 793, 799 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1983); In re Coastal Equities,
Inc., 39 Bankr. 304, 307-09 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).
71. In re Roberts, 46 Bankr. 815 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985), rev'd in part, 75
Bankr. 402 (D. Utah 1987).
72. In re Arlan's Dep't Stores, 615 F.2d 925, 933 (2d Cir. 1979) ("If that duty
[disclosure] is neglected, however innocently, surely they [the attorney] should stand
not better than if it had been performed.") (quoting In re Rogers-Pyatt Shellac Co., 51
F.2d 988, 992 (2d Cir. 1931)).
73. See, e.g., In re Marine Power & Equip. Co., 67 Bankr. 643, 654 (W.D.
Wash. 1986).
74. Arlan's Dep't Stores, 615 F.2d at 937.
75. Coastal Equities, 39 Bankr. at 309.
76. Roberts, 46 Bankr. at 839.
77. See Flowers, Attorney Fees: Handling Bankruptcies Without Getting There
Yourself, 64 W. VA. L. REv. 671 (1982).
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adverse to the estate with respect to the matter on which such professional
person is employed."781
It is unsettling to know that the court has the power at any time to deny
the fees which an attorney has worked very hard to earn in a bankruptcy case.
Just ask the attorneys in the In re 765 Associates" case. They were not only
denied fees, but were ordered to reimburse the estate for fees already received
when a conflict was found. The approach in In re 765 Associates is at the
opposite extreme from the Heatron" case. While 765 Associates required the
attorneys to repay the debtor's estate when a nondisclosed conflict of interest
existed, the Heatron court ignored that an attorney-creditor's interest may not
always be coterminous with the debtor's best interests.8 ' There must be some
middle ground that would allow the court to balance the competing policy
considerations entangled within § 327.
Bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. 2 Equity contemplates fairness,
practicability, and workability in fashioning remedies.83 The reality is that it is
not uncommon for a debtor to be indebted to his attorney on the date the
bankruptcy petition is filed.84 Is it fair to an attorney who has successfully
brought a debtor through a reorganization plan to be admonished rather than
applauded for his efforts because a purely hypothetical conflict exists? Com-
mon sense answers no. Certainly, even courts of equity must follow the rules
that Congress has laid down. But such courts are not required to follow the
rules blindly. Bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, "should have the ability
to deviate from [the rules] in those cases in which the need for attorney disci-
pline is outweighed by the equities of the case."' 5 The court in In Re Roberts8
aptly described the dilemma;
when dealing with ethical principles .... we cannot paint with broad strokes.
The lines are fine and must be so marked. Guide posts can be established
when virgin ground is being explored and the conclusion in a particular case
can be reached only after a painstaking analysis of the facts and precise appli-
cation of precedent.8 7
Few would argue that a blanket denial of fees whenever a possible conflict
78. 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) (1979) (emphasis added).
79. 14 Bankr. 449 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1981).
80. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
82. Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966).
83. In re Anver, 44 Bankr. 615, 620 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (citing Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973)).
84. The court in Anver mused that a large percentage of persons hired in bank-
ruptcy proceedings are pre-petition creditors and wondered why the issue of conflict of
interest under § 327(a) had not arisen more often. Anver, 44 Bankr. at 619.
85. In re Watson Seafood & Poultry Co., 40 Bankr. 436, 440 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
1984).
86. 75 Bankr. 402 (D. Utah 1987).
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of interests exists is the ideal approach to interpreting § 327(a). The integrity
of the Bankruptcy Court is of paramount concern and any appearance of
wrongdoing created by a conflict of interest should be prevented. On the other
hand, there are competing equities entangled within a strict interpretation of §
327(a) that should be considered. The courts should take into account the
plight of the debtor going through bankruptcy proceedings. "Most debtors
can't afford one attorney, let alone two."88 Disqualification of the debtor's at-
torney means the debtor must incur the expenses associated with retaining a
new attorney. The debtor is unlikely to understand why he is being forced to
seek new counsel at such an economically and often emotionally devastating
time. This turn of events is likely to produce just what the rule was intended to
prevent - undermined public confidence in the bankruptcy system. Reorganiza-
tion plans are often quite complex; the newly appointed attorney will likely
spend numerous hours just acquainting himself with the case. Bankruptcy pro-
ceedings will be delayed. Ultimately, it will be the creditors who pay because
the bankruptcy estate will be depleted by the attorney's fees.
A literal reading of § 327(a) will not only cause the debtor delay and
expense, but may also deprive the debtor of highly qualified counsel of his own
choosing. The effect a potential conflict of interest has on the debtor's right to
counsel of his choice has been recognized as an important consideration (at
least by the courts outside of the bankruptcy system) in determining whether
counsel should be disqualified.
In the seminal case on conflict of interests, Woods v. City National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago,89 the Court observed a need to maintain a
balance between prohibiting the unethical conduct of attorneys and other so-
cial interests including a litigant's right to freely chosen counsel. The court in
Emle Industries" reiterated the concerns expressed in Woods: "[We are] con-
scious of our responsibility to preserve a balance, delicate though it may be,
between an individual's right to his own freely chosen counsel and the need to
maintain the highest ethical standards of professional responsibility."'
Neither Woods nor Emle involve a bankruptcy proceeding. Maybe that is
why the bankruptcy courts have felt unobliged to balance the debtor's right to
counsel of choice when disqualifying attorneys under Section 327(a). Or per-
haps the courts believe that Congress has already performed this balancing
test. One court has stated that "when [Congress] enacted § 327(a), [it] made
a choice that efficiency would be sacrificed for the appearance of propriety." ' 2
Presumably, other factors such as the debtor's right to decide who shall re-
present him were sacrificed (if not ignored) when Congress promulgated Sec-
tion 327(a). Surely if the rights of the debtors, creditors and attorneys had in
88. In re Freedom Solar Center, Inc., 49 Bankr. 996 (D. Me.), rev'd, 776 F.2d
14 (1st Cir. 1985).
89. 312 U.S. 262 (1941).
90. Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973).
91. Id. at 564-65.
92. In re Gray, 64 Bankr. 505, 508 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
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fact been balanced against the bankruptcy court's need for the appearance of
propriety, a more functional solution regarding the application of Section
327(a) would have emerged.
The commentators and practitioners have taken varied approaches to alle-
viating the problems created by Section 327(a). Clearly, any possible conflict
of interest can not be solved by the debtor paying the attorney the debt owed
for pre-petition work just prior to filing the bankruptcy petition. Such a trans-
fer could be voided as a preference 93 if made within 90 days of the bankruptcy
filing. An attorney might avoid the conflict of interest problem if they en-
courage all clients who foreseeably might file bankruptcy in the next few
months to stay current in their payment of attorneys fees, and not hold a past
due account. Unfortunately, attorneys are not clairvoyant and cannot predict
with certainty which of their clients will end up in bankruptcy. Also, since
bankruptcy proceedings do not occur in a vacuum, the debtor has often been
involved in adversarial proceedings prior to the bankruptcy which either led to
or contributed to the debtor's financial demise. When an adversarial action
precedes bankruptcy, the likelihood that the debtor will owe the attorney for
services already rendered increases. Financially. distressed clients are unlikely
to be able to negotiate a "cash and carry" plan for an attorney's services.
An attorney may be forced to make a Hobson's choice: Waiving all pre-
petition debts at the outset of the bankruptcy case so the attorney will be
eligible for employment under § 327(a) or refusing to represent his client in
bankruptcy proceedings because a potential conflict of interest exists.
A less ethical solution has reportedly been employed by at least one firm
(hereinafter referred to as Firm "X"). 9 4 Firm "X" uses a straw party to avoid
the quandary caused by § 327(a). Firm X has had a number of clients who
owed the firm money for pre-petition work and later sought the services of the
firm to initiate bankruptcy proceedings. Rather than decline their services,
Firm X hired Firm Y, a second firm, to act as a straw party. Firm Y's only
responsibility is to complete an application for employment and act as attorney
of record, so that the potential conflict problems caused by the debt owed to
Firm X would not be revealed. Firm X actually completes the majority of the
work on the case and is reimbursed from the fees received by Firm Y (of
course Firm Y would have to make all court appearances). Certainly this is
unethical, if not unlawful.9 5
93. See, e.g., In re Crisp, 64 Bankr. 351, 353 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) ("[T]he
conflict of interest would not be eliminated if the law firm obtained from the client a
pre-petition payment of these fees and costs because such a payment would likely con-
stitute a preference that may be avoided for the benefit of other creditors ..
(quoting In re Roberts, 46 Bankr. 815, 849 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985)).
94. The author was unable to determine the name of this firm or verify if this
tactic was in fact being used to deceive the bankruptcy court.
95. In re Matis, 73 Bankr. 228, 230 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) noted that "a fee
sharing arrangement between attorneys wherein one party simply referred the case to
the other and performed no actual services was now not entitled to shard in any corn-
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A more ethical, prophylactic system is proposed by D. Kent Meyers, in
his article on ethical considerations in representing multiple creditors.9" Mey-
ers suggests six ways to avoid conflict of interest problems, such as those cre-
ated by § 327(a). They are as follows:
1. Each lawyer or law firm should make a formal commitment to abide by
the highest ethical standards. This commitment can be implemented in a
partnership agreement or as part of the written office policy, and developed by
encouraging active participation on local, state, or national bar committees on
professional responsibility.97
2. An intra-firm Professional Responsibility Committee is recommended to
conduct intra-firm training and to resolve and avoid firm conflict problems.9 8
3. The Code of Professional Responsibility should be re-emphasized in the
training of new associates and lay personnel.99
4. Professional employment data should be circulated throughout the firm to
.,raise conflict of interest 'red flags'."'100
5. An attorney or law firm should candidly discuss the firm's conflict of inter-
est policy and any potential problems that could arise with their clients.' 0'
6. A new local bankruptcy rule which provides that:
In addition to any requirements of other applicable statutes or rules, any per-
son representing more than one creditor shall file a signed statement with the
court setting forth that:
(1) The multiple representation has been disclosed to each such creditor;
(2) The actual or potential conflict of interest has been discussed with each
such creditor;
(3) Each such creditor has agreed to the multiple representation;
(4) The signor shall advise all such creditors and the court should any mate-
rial change take place that disqualifies the signor from continuing the multi-
ple representation. 102
A practical solution was suggested by the court in the Roberts case.les
The Roberts court proposed applying a balancing test, weighing the need for
attorney discipline against other factors such as the conduct of the attorney in
this particular case, the success of the reorganization plan, and the absence of
complaints from other creditors. 10' This case-by-case approach is much more
flexible than Pierce'0 5 and the line of cases that unconditionally deny fees
pensation paid by the bankrupt." Id. Conversely, it would seem that the party to whom
the case was referred, the "straw party", would not be entitled to compensation, result-
ing in a denial of fees to "Firm X" in the situation described in the text.
96. Meyers, Ethical Considerations in the Representations of Multiple Credi-
tors Against a Single Debtor, 51 AMER. BANKR. L.J. 19 (1977).
97. Id. at 26.
98. Id. at 27.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 28.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 28-29.
103. In re Roberts, 75 Bankr. 402 (D. Utah 1987).
104. Id. at 412-13.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
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when a potential conflict exists. Roberts is also one of the few bankruptcy
cases that closely approximates the standards set by the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. Only a few of the bankruptcy cases involving conflicts
of interest even give lip service to the rules of Professional Responsibility. Gen-
erally, the courts have noted that their decisions would have been no different
under the Code of Professional Responsibility as if the similar results have
occurred by coincidence rather than compulsion." 6
It appears that different standards of conduct are being applied in and out
of the Bankruptcy Courts.' This may be due in part to the fact that conflicts
of interest are more prevalent in bankruptcy cases."0 8 For whatever reason, the
trend is to treat conflict of interest problems more seriously when they arise in
a bankruptcy court. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 9 is
entitled "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety."
"[U]nder this canon there must be a showing of a reasonable possibility that
some specifically identifiable impropriety in fact occurred and that the likeli-
hood of public suspicion must be weighed against the interest in retaining
counsel of one's choice."'' 09 In contrast, the bankruptcy courts do not require
either a likelihood of some specific injury or a balancing test."x0 All that must
be shown is that a potential conflict exists."'
Attorneys should not be subjected to more stringent ethical standards
when they enter the bankruptcy courtroom. "The very concept of a profes-
sional ethic precludes the varying of ethical principles when applied to differ-
ent areas of the law.""' Applying more rigid ethical standards to attorneys
practicing in bankruptcy courts could foster the belief that bankruptcy pro-
106. See, e.g., In re Michigan Gen. Corp., 78 Bankr. 479, 484 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1987); In re Marine Power & Equip. Co., 67 Bankr. 643, 648 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
1986); In re B.E.T. Genetics, Inc., 35 Bankr. 269, 271 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1983); In re
Philadelphia Athletic Club, 20 Bankr. 328, 335 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
107. An in-depth comparison of the courts' treatment of conflicts of interest
under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as compared to the Bankruptcy
Code is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a more complete discussion of this
comparison, see Stranko, Attorney Conflicts of Interest in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 9
J. LEGAL PROF. 229 (1984).
108. Stranko, supra note 107, suggests that the drafters of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act increased the potential for conflict problems by delegating more responsibility
to debtor's attorneys. Id. at 230-31. As a practical matter, bankruptcies involve more
parties than the typical adversarial action with a single plaintiff and defendant. The
likelihood that an attorney may have an "adverse" interest or is not "disinterested"
increases as the number of parties involved increases.
109. Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, 590 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir.
1979).
110. See, e.g., In re Marine Power & Equip. Co., 67 Bankr. 643, 653 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. 1986) (a court may deny compensation even in the absence of an actual
conflict of interest).
111. See, e.g., Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 64 Bankr. 600, 606
(N.D. Ohio 1986) (even a possibility of a conflict may warrant disqualification).
112. Stranko, Attorney Conflicts of Interest in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 9 J. LE-
GAL PROF. 229, 229 (1984).
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ceedings and bankruptcy attorneys need closer scrutiny.
One court indicated its dissatisfaction with a literal interpretation of Sec-
tion 327(a), but stated that it was bound to interpret the section as written
until Congress lends a hand to either interpret or rewrite Section 327(a).18
Until that time comes, attorneys should be aware that general principles of
what constitutes a conflict of interest may not hold true in the bankruptcy
court. The issue of just what type of relationship between debtor and his attor-
ney will create a conflict in the context of bankruptcy proceedings is not yet
clear. The cases cited throughout this article do not establish any solid guide-
lines to provide comfort to the practicing attorney who expects to be paid for
his services. Rather, these cases should act as a caution light, signaling attor-
neys to proceed with care whenever a former client asks for representation in a
bankruptcy matter. The best course of action is to err on the side of caution
and disclose even the most remote associations between the debtor and the
attorney or the attorney's firm, as well as disclosing all past, present, and fu-
ture fee arrangements. Any embarrassment from disqualification at the outset
of a case is certainly preferable to discovering a conflict or adverse interest
well into the case when the financial impact of an order denying all fees may
be devastating.
Finally, experienced bankruptcy attorneys should not be lulled into a false
sense of security because they have ignored the requirements of Section 327(a)
in the past without sanctions or comment. The conflict of interest problems
caused by Section 327(a), especially the situation where the attorney is a cred-
itor of the debtor by way of unpaid pre-petition attorneys fees, are not just
academic. Although the majority of courts have overlooked this problem area
in the past, the trend set by recent cases like Pierce is to strictly interpret
Section 327(a) and deny attorney fees whenever the attorney is not "disinter-
ested" or contains an interest adverse to the estate.
PATTI WILLIAMS
113. See, e.g., In re Anver Corp., 44 Bankr. 615, 619 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
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